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Abstract: Banks financing decisions remain an enigma, increasingly attracting the attention of banking regulators and 
corporate finance scholars alike. This article sought to establish whether banks seek to achieve a target capital structure 
in their financing decision making and if so at what speed of adjustment (SOA) do they gravitate towards this target? 
Utilising a sample of 16 South African banks for the period 2006-2015, we employed panel data techniques to 
determine whether banks have a target capital structure that they quest for. A partial adjustment model was estimated 
using the LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction estimator which controls for cross-sectional dependence and to 
determine the speed of adjustment towards this target. Robustness checks were also conducted to establish whether the 
SOA is dependent on the source of financing used. The results documented that South African banks have a target 
capital structure which they quest for, and adjust to this target at a SOA of 44% or a half-life of 2.4 years which is 
relatively faster to that of non-financial firms. These findings relegate capital regulations to be of secondary importance 
in the determination of bank capital structure. At worst bank capital regulations might not be binding at all. 
Keywords: Banks; Firm level; Leverage; Speed of adjustment 
JEL Classification: G01; G21; G32 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1.Background 
The financing behaviour of banking firms is a concept that has not been explored extensively in 
corporate finance research. This has been premised on the notion that since banks are regulated entities, 
their financing decisions are an involuntarily one and regulation solely determines their capital structure 
choices. To further compound this conundrum, banks are peculiar firms in that they have an additional 
source of financing in the form of deposits, which other non-firms do not have recourse to. Arguably the 
bank fixed effects might have a bearing on their capital structure choices. 
Capital structure research has continued unabated in the aftermath of Modigliani and Miller (1958 & 
1963) seminal-works. Extant studies that have been conducted have demonstrated that capital structure 
does matter in enhancing firm value. Further studies that have been conducted in the last two decades 
demonstrate that firms seek to achieve optimality in their capital structure choices (see for instance; 
Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999; Barclay & Smith, 2005; Flannery & Rangan, 2008; Ramjee & 
Gwatidzo, 2012 amongst others). What is indisputable empirically is that firms seek to achieve a target 
capital structure. However, what is still subject to conjecture is how does this adjustment take effect? 
What is the true SOA? and what are the determinants of the SOA? 
1.2. Research Gap 
Notwithstanding that the research conducted on the existence of a target capital structure has been 
extensive, it has been mainly confined on examining the financing behaviour non-financial firms. With 
regard to the financing of banking firms, it has been demonstrated that banks make voluntary and 
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involuntary capital structure decisions. The research in this area is still at a nascent stage. To the best 
knowledge of this researcher, Gropp and Heider (2010) were the first researchers to establish whether 
banks seek to achieve optimality in their capital structure choices. They established that banks are not 
dissimilar from non-financial firms in that they seek to achieve a target capital structure.  However, they 
did not go as far as establishing how this adjustment can take place in different scenarios. Moreover, 
they did not seek to estimate the “true” speed of adjustment as they did not take regard of the 
interdependence and inherent spill-overs in bank financing.  
1.3. Contribution of this Study 
Against this backdrop the present study sought to establish whether banks quest for a target capital 
structure in their financing behaviour, which area has been under-explored. Secondly, the principal 
departure from Gropp and Heider (2010) and Moyo (2016) amongst others, is that this study employed a 
risk measure that directly captures credit risk, as opposed to the standard deviation of stock returns. 
Thirdly, this study estimated the true SOA by factoring in interdependence of banks in their financing 
behaviour. As such, the study corrected for cross sectional dependence in estimation by utilising the 
LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction estimator which is a cross-sectional dependence consistent 
estimator. Lastly, this study sought to establish the dynamics of adjustment for a bank for the various 
sources of debt employed. To the best knowledge of the researcher this had not been tested empirically. 
1.4. Organisation of the Paper 
The remainder of paper is arranged as follows: the next section reviews the literature about capital 
structure. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical findings and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Review of Related Literature 
The static trade-off theory has managers seeking optimal capital structure (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 
1999, p. 226). These scholars posit that random events would cause managers to drift away from the 
optimal capital structure, and they would then have to work back gradually. If the optimum debt ratio is 
stable, a mean-reverting behaviour towards this target capital structure would be expected. The first 
caveat was perhaps aptly put by Flannery and Rangan (2008, p. 407), who observed that in a frictionless 
world, firms would always maintain their target leverage. However, transaction costs may prevent 
immediate adjustment to a firm’s target, as the firm trades off adjustment costs against the costs of 
operating with a suboptimal debt ratio. The second caveat is enunciated by Barclay and Smith (2005, p. 
15). They contend that even if managers set target leverage ratios, unexpected increases or shortfalls in 
profitability, along with occasional attempts to exploit financing “windows of opportunity”, can cause 
companies to deviate from their targets. In such cases, there will be what amounts to an optimal 
deviation from those targets – one that depends on the transaction costs associated with adjusting back 
to the target relative to the (opportunity) costs of deviating from the target. 
The first strand of literature delves on the existence of a target capital structure. Amongst others, Elsas, 
Flannery and Garfinkel (2014, p. 1380) evaluated US firms’ leverage determinants by studying how 
firms paid for 2 073 very large investments between 1989 and 2006. They found strong evidence 
consistent with target adjustment behaviour for their sample firms. First, they found that the type of 
securities issued to finance a large investment significantly depends on the deviation between a firm’s 
target and actual leverage. Overleveraged firms issue less debt and more equity when financing large 
projects, and vice versa. This result holds for a variety of methods for estimating leverage targets. 
Second, they demonstrated that firms making large investments converge unusually rapidly towards 
target leverage ratio. 
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Secondly, Flannery and Rangan (2006, p. 471) employed a sample of US firms (excluding financial 
firms and regulated utilities) included in the Compustat industrial annual tapes between the years 1965 
and 2001. Their evidence indicates that firms do target a long-run capital structure, and that the typical 
firm converges towards its long-run target at a rate of more than 30% per year. In addition, they aver 
that this adjustment speed is roughly three times faster than many existing estimates in the literature, 
and affords targeting behaviour an empirically important effect on firms’ observed capital structures. 
They also contend that target debt ratios depend on well-accepted firm characteristics. Firms that are 
underleveraged or overleveraged by this measure soon adjust their debt ratios to offset the observed gap. 
Thirdly, Leary and Roberts (2005, p. 2577), by utilising a sample of non-financial and non-utility firms 
listed on the annual Compustat files for the years 1984 to 2001, performed a non-parametric analysis of 
the leverage response of equity-issuing firms, and also examined the impact of introducing adjustment 
costs into their empirical framework. They found that firms are significantly more likely to increase 
(decrease) leverage if their leverage is relatively low (high), if their leverage has been decreasing 
(accumulating), or if they have recently decreased (increased) their leverage through past financing 
decisions. This is consistent with the existence of a target range for leverage, as in the dynamic trade-off 
model. 
Fourthly, Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian (2004, p. 520), using annual firm-level data from the 
Compustat industrial, full coverage and research files for all US firms (and also excluding financial 
firms) for the years 1982 to 2000, found evidence consistent with a hybrid hypothesis that firms have 
target debt ratios but also prefer internal financing to external funds. They also found that profitability 
has no effect on target leverage. 
Fifthly, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001, p. 1) tested for the existence of a target debt level by 
employing firm-level data of US firms from the 1997 Standard and Poor’s Compustat annual files 
(including the research file) for the 1979–1997 period. They also excluded financial firms. They found 
that specifically, when firms either raise or retire significant amounts of new capital, their choices move 
them towards the target capital structures suggested by the static trade-off models, often more than 
offsetting the effects of accumulated profits and losses (Hovakimian et al., 2001, p. 22). They further 
suggest that the tendency of firms to make financial choices that move them towards a target debt ratio 
appears to be more important when they choose between equity repurchases and debt retirements than 
when they choose between equity and debt issuances. 
From the foregoing it is impelling to suggest that there exists a target capital structure that each firm 
seeks to achieve. It would seem that it is a target range and firms seek to operate within this target range. 
The attainment of this target is also dependent on firm-level characteristics.  
The second strand of literature has sought to establish the determinants of the speed of adjustment 
towards the target debt ratio. The main determinants of the speed of adjustment that have been cited in 
literature are size, the cost of adjustment, the distance between observed leverage and target leverage 
and growth. 
Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008, p. 83) employed a sample comprising of all non-financial firms, 
traded in the major stock exchanges of the five major economies of the world – France, Germany, 
Japan, the UK and the USA – from 1987 to 2000. Using dynamic models of estimation, such as a two-
step syst-GMM procedure, they found evidence that reveals the presence of dynamism in the capital 
structure decisions of firms operating in the Group of 5 countries. They contend that managers assess 
the trade-off between the cost of adjustment and the cost of being off target. Therefore, the speed at 
which they adjust their capital structure may crucially depend on the financial systems and corporate 
governance traditions of each country. 
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Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010, p. 261) studied the dynamics of capital structure in the context of 
Indian manufacturing companies in a partial-adjustment framework during the period 1993/1994–
2007/2008. They considered all the companies available in the PROWESS database. They found strong 
evidence of a positive relationship between the speed of adjustment and the distance variable. They 
reason that this result confirms the idea that the firm’s cost of maintaining a suboptimal debt ratio is 
higher than the cost of adjustment and that the fixed costs of adjustments are not significant. Therefore, 
the firms that are sufficiently away from their target leverage always want to reach the optimal very 
quickly. A positive relationship was also found between size of the firm and the adjustment speed. They 
contend that this result lends support to the hypothesis that for large firms the adjustment costs are 
relatively lesser than for small firms due to the less asymmetric information. Therefore, the adjustment 
speed to the target leverage ratio has been more for large firms than small firms. Furthermore, they also 
found evidence that firms with higher growth opportunities adjust faster towards their target leverage. 
This confirms the a priori expectation that a growing firm may find it easier to change its capital 
structure by altering the composition of new issuances. 
Lastly, Öztekin and Flannery (2012, p. 108) estimated a standard partial adjustment model of leverage 
for firms in 37 countries during the period 1991–2006. They found that the mean adjustment speed is 
approximately 21% per year with a half-life of three and two years for book and market leverage, 
respectively, but that the estimated adjustment speeds vary from 4% (in Columbia) to 41% (in New 
Zealand) per year. In terms of the half-life of adjustment, the mean speed implies three years, and the 
range varies between one and a half and 17 years. As such, they reject the constraint that firms in all 
countries have the same adjustment speed. They reason that variation in leverage adjustment speeds 
must reflect something about the costs and benefits of moving towards target leverage. They further 
conjecture that the effectiveness of a country’s legal, financial and political institutions is systematically 
related to cross-country differences in adjustment speeds. Moreover, their results suggest that higher 
aggregate adjustment costs reduce estimated adjustment speed by roughly 12% of the average country’s 
adjustment speed, even after they account for adaptations to firm characteristics that tend to raise 
adjustment speeds. As such, they contend that evidence that adjustment speeds vary plausibly with 
international differences in important financial system features provides support for the applicability of 
a partial adjustment model of leverage adjustment to private firms. 
Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012, p. 52) employed a dynamic model to investigate the capital structure 
determinants for 178 firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for the period 1998–2008. 
The sample of firms was also used to examine the cost and speed of adjustment towards a target debt 
ratio. They analysed the speed of adjustment towards the target debt ratio by estimating a system of 
GMM. Further, they also examined the determinants of target capital structure for South African listed 
firms. Their results suggest that a target debt-equity ratio does exist for South African firms. In addition, 
they also found that these firms bear greater transaction costs when adjusting to a target debt ratio than 
to a target long-term debt ratio. However, they do adjust to their target ratios relatively quickly.  
Their study also reveals that firms with a larger proportion of tangible assets have higher debt ratios, 
more profitable firms operate at lower levels of leverage, larger firms operate at higher levels leverage, 
and fast-growing firms prefer debt to equity when raising funds. Further, they found that when firms 
require finance, they prefer internal to external sources of finance. They reason that these firms seem to 
take into account the trade-off between the costs and benefits of debt when making financing decisions. 
The evidence that they lead suggests that the capital structure decisions of South African listed firms 
follow both the pecking order and the trade-off theories of capital structure. 
Chipeta, Wolmarans and Vermaak (2012, p. 171) investigated the dynamics of firm leverage within the 
context of a transition economy of South Africa. They employed a sample consisting of non-financial 
firms that were listed on the JSE before and after the financial liberalisation phase. They utilised the I-
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Net Bridge database to source audited income statements, balance sheets and financial ratios for a 
sample of firms that operated from 1989 to 2007. Their data were split between the two regimes, namely 
the pre-liberalisation period (1989–1994) and the post-liberalisation period (1995–2007). Their results 
confirm the predictions of most the theories of capital structure.  
For the pre-liberalisation period, on the one hand, they report an inverse relationship between firm 
leverage and the profitability and size variables. On the other hand, they found a positive relationship 
between firm leverage and the tax variable. Further, for the post-liberalisation period they found that on 
the one hand, firm leverage is positively associated with the size, growth and dividend payout variables. 
On the other hand, firm leverage was found to be negatively related to the profitability, tax and asset 
tangibility variables. Moreover, they found that the empirical relationship between the firm-specific 
determinants of capital structure and leverage is statistically stronger for the post- liberalised regime 
than the pre-liberalised era. The same holds for the coefficient on the target leverage. They reason that 
this confirms their conjecture that transaction costs are lower in a post-liberalised regime.  
The dynamics of capital structure adjustment speeds for financially constrained and unconstrained South 
African listed non-financial firms across the business cycle were examined by Auret, Chipeta and 
Krishna (2013, p. 75). They established that macroeconomic conditions affect the speed at which South 
African firms adjust toward their target capital structures. Their results documented evidence that 
although not overwhelming, firms adjust faster in unfavourable macroeconomic states, suggesting that 
the cost of deviating from optimum leverage are higher in such conditions and that firms adjust faster in 
order to avoid such costs. Their results were also indicative that financial constraints affect adjustment 
behaviour as adjustment speeds for the constrained and unconstrained samples differed in several 
aspects. 
In the final analysis it would seem that firms set a target debt ratio. They gravitate towards this target 
ratio. It could be that they operate within a target range of this ratio. Notwithstanding the quest to 
operate within this target range, there are some factors that can aid or militate against this objective. For 
instance, the prohibitive adjustment costs can hinder firms from rebalancing their debt ratio should it fall 
outside the optimum range. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample Description and Data Sources 
The population for this study comprised of South African banking institutions both listed and not listed 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. All the banks with complete data sets for the ten-year period 
running from 2006 to 2015 were considered for this study. The Bureau van Dijk Bank Focus database 
was used to source the audited financial statements of the banks. There were 16 such banks.  
3.2. The Dynamic Panel Data Model 
A dynamic panel data model was specified to study the target leverage and determine the speed of 
adjustment towards the target level. The econometric analysis was conducted by employing Stata 
version 14 software. Extant studies have modelled the target capital structure by employing a partial 
adjustment framework. Amongst others, these include Flannery and Rangan (2006); Antoniou et al 
(2008); Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010); Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012); Lemma and Negash (2014) and 
De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015). We take cue from such studies and specify a partial adjustment 
framework in order to determine whether there exists a target capital structure as follows: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝜷 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑡                          (1) 
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Where: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
∗  = target leverage (BLE, DEP or NON-DEP) 
𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′  = a vector of explanatory variables (Size, Profit, Growth, Asset tangibility, Dividend, Risk and 
GFC) for bank i at time t. 
β = a vector of slope parameters 
𝜑𝑖,𝑡 = disturbance term 
Banks will seek to gravitate to the target capital structure. They could be impeded in adjusting to this 
optimal leverage ratio due to the presence of adjustment costs. Thus banks would adjust towards their 
target leverage as follows: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛿(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
∗ − 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1), with 0 < 𝛿 < 1          (2) 
The parameter 𝛿 is the coefficient of adjustment or the speed of adjustment. The speed of adjustment is 
inversely related to adjustment costs (Ramjee & Gwatidzo, 2012, p. 58). If 𝛿=1 the actual change in 
leverage is equal to the desired and the adjustment is transaction cost free. If 𝛿=0, there is no adjustment 
in leverage. The absence of adjustment is possible when adjustment costs are excessively high or the 
cost of adjustment is significantly higher than the cost of remaining off target (Antoniou et al, 2008). 
Substituting the equation of target leverage, Eq. (1) into Eq. (2) yields the following: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛿𝜷 + 𝛿𝜑𝑖,𝑡           (3) 
The dynamic panel data model as specified in Eq. (3) is fraught with two sources of persistence over 
time. These are autocorrelation due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1) among 
the regressors as well as the presence of individual effects characterising the heterogeneity among the 
individuals. This renders estimation with either OLS or GLS biased and inefficient. One way to alleviate 
this problem is to employ the generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators, namely the 
differenced-GMM (diff-GMM) and system-GMM (syst-GMM). As such to estimate the dynamic 
model, firstly, initial diagnostics were performed on the base pooled OLS, fixed effects and random 
effects models.  Subsequently, both the diff-GMM and syst-GMM estimators were employed. The 
caveat was that the diff-GMM and syst-GMM estimators usually perform poorly for small samples and 
may not have been the most efficient estimators taking cognisance of the sample properties. As such, the 
LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction estimators, which is a cross-sectional dependence and 
heteroscedasticity consistent estimator was employed in estimation.  The diff-GMM and syst-GMM 
were also used in estimation for reference purposes. 
3.3. Variable Definition 
3.3.1. Dependent Variables 
In this study three dependent variables were employed to test the relationship between leverage and its 
determinants. The primary dependent variable employed for this study was book leverage. The book 
leverage measure (BLE), is a broad measure of leverage—which was defined as one minus the ratio of 
book value of equity to book value of assets1. This follows from Gropp and Heider (2010). Because 
                                                             
1 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
→
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
=
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
→
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
= 1 −
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
,  
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banks have an additional source of financing, in the form of deposits, in this study leverage was also 
decomposed to analyse the dynamics of deposit financing. The secondary measures of leverage 
employed in this study were deposit leverage (deposit liabilities) and non-deposit leverage (non-deposit 
liabilities). Deposit leverage (DEPOSIT) equals the ratio of total deposits to total assets. This is 
consistent with Gropp and Heider (2010, p. 605). Non-deposit leverage (NON-DEP) is the difference 
between book leverage and deposit leverage. 
3.3.2. Independent Variables 
The independent variables consisted of the firm level determinants of capital structure as well as dummy 
variables. The firm level determinants of capital structure that are reliably important and were 
considered for this study are size, growth, profitability, asset tangibility and risk. The dummy variables 
that were employed for this study were to capture the effects of the 2007-2009 financial crises as well as 
a dummy variable to capture one remaining firm level determinant of capital structure—dividends.  
 Size 
To measure size, we employed the natural logarithm of total assets. There is a direct relationship 
between size and the value of assets held. Larger companies are expected to have more assets. Most 
studies on the determinants of capital structure have employed this proxy to measure size. Such studies 
include, Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011); Antoniou et al. (2008); Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç‐Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001); Frank and Goyal (2009); Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010) and Oztekin and 
Flannery (2012) amongst others. Other studies have employed the logarithm of sales or net sales to 
capture the effect of size (see for instance, Titman and Wessels (1988); Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Barclay and Smith (2005).  
 Growth 
We defined the growth variable as the annual growth rate of total assets. We took cue from Titman and 
Wessels (1988) and Anarfor (2015) amongst others, in defining growth as such. The reasoning is that 
the higher the growth rate, the higher the growth prospects of the company. The alternative definition 
which has also been used widely in empirical studies would have been to proxy growth prospects with 
the market-to-book value ratio (see amongst others, Booth et al, 2001; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Teixeira, 
Silva, Fernandes & Alves, 2014).  
 Asset tangibility 
In this study asset tangibility was defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. The ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets expresses the collateral value. Fixed assets offer collateral value. If collateral value 
is high, the firm would be viewed in good light in the debt market. As such it could access loans at 
concessionary rates. We were motivated to employ the fixed assets to total assets ratio as a proxy for 
asset tangibility as extant studies have utilised this measure. The empirical studies that have employed 
this measure include Rajan and Zingales (1995); Frank and Goyal (2009); Mukherjee and Mahakud 
(2010); Oztekin and Flannery (2012) and De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015) amongst others. 
 Profitability 
Various measures have been employed in empirical studies to capture the effect of profitability. This is 
partly because profitability is defined in several ways. In this study we employed the return on assets 
(ROA) measure as the proxy for profitability. Boot et al (2001) and Anarfor (2015) amongst others, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
      ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐵𝐿𝐸 = 1 −
𝐸
𝑇𝐴
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employ ROA as an indicator of profitability in similar studies.  In the case of the banks this is defined as 
the return on average assets (ROAA). 
 Risk 
The proxy that we employed for risk measures bank credit risk. It was defined as the ratio of impaired 
loans to gross loans.  
 Dummy variables 
We employed two dummy variables in this study. The first one was the dummy variable (DIVIDEND) 
for dividends. It was defined as one, when a bank paid out a dividend and zero when the bank did not 
declare a dividend. The second dummy variable (GFC) was to capture the effects of the financial crises. 
It was defined as one for the years when the financial crisis occurred and zero otherwise. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
It is conceivable that banks also seek to achieve a target capital structure in their financing in a like 
fashion to non-financial firms. As such, this section addresses the question whether banks seek to 
achieve a target capital structure in their financing. Firstly, the correlations amongst the variables are 
considered in this section. Secondly, initial diagnostics were performed on the partial adjustment model 
estimated and a robust model was estimated and inferences drawn thereof. Robustness checks were 
conducted for the alternative definitions of leverage. 
4.1. Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix of book leverage and firm level determinants of capital structure with the 
inclusion of lagged book leverage is presented in Table 1. The lagged book leverage variable is highly 
correlated to the book leverage. It explains 95% of the variation in book leverage. This demonstrates 
that leverage is persistent and has feedback. Current levels of bank leverage are determined by past 
levels of leverage. The firm level determinants are correlated with the lagged dependent variable in the 
same manner as they are correlated with the book leverage variable. Suffice to highlight that a negative 
correlation exists between the lagged booked leverage variable and growth, risk, asset tangibility and 
profits. A positive relationship exists between the lagged book leverage variable and the size and 
dividend variables. 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix 
 BOOK  
LEVERA
GE 
BOOK 
LEVERAGE(-1) 
GROWTH PRO
FIT 
ASSET  
TANGIBILIT
Y 
RISK SI
ZE  
DIVIDEN
D 
BOOK LEVERAGE 1.000        
BOOK LEVERAGE (-
1) 
0.949*** 1.000       
GROWTH -0.201** -0.411*** 1.000      
PROFIT -0.629*** -0.519*** 0.411*** 1.000     
ASSET TANGIBILITY -0.409*** -0.352*** 0.131 0.261
*** 
1.000    
RISK  -0.085 -0.170** 0.047 -
0.178
** 
0.123 1.000   
SIZE 0.290*** 0.288*** -0.127 -
0.210
*** 
-0.027 -0.004 1.0
00 
 
DIVIDEND 0.280*** 0.358*** -0.069 0.002 -0.143* -
0.196
** 
0.1
88
* 
1.000 
(*)/(**) and (***) indicates the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The variables are defined as follows:  
Book Leverage= 1- (Equity/Total Assets); Deposit Leverage= Total Deposits/Total Assets; Non-deposit leverage = Book 
leverage – Deposit leverage; Growth=growth rate of Total Assets; Profit= Return on Average Assets (ROAA);  
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Asset tangibility=Fixed Assets/Total Assets; Risk= Impaired Loans/Gross Loans; Size= natural logarithm of Total Assets;  
Dividend = dummy variable = (1 when dividend is paid and, 0 when dividend is not paid). 
 
4.2. Diagnostic Tests of the Target Capital Structure Regression with Book Leverage as the 
Dependent Variable 
In order to estimate a robust model, diagnostic tests were conducted on the initially estimated fixed 
effects and random effects model. The tests are reported in Table 2.  
Table 2. Pre-estimation tests to estimate target capital structure with book leverage as the dependent 
variable 
Test Test 
Statistic 
Critical Value Inference 
Joint validity of cross-sectional 
individual effects 
H0 : 𝜶𝟏 =  𝜶𝟐 = ⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  =
 𝟎 
HA: : 𝜶𝟏 ≠  𝜶𝟐 ≠
⋯  𝜶𝑵−𝟏  ≠  𝟎 
F=5.08 F(0.01,15,137)=2.192 Cross-sectional specific effects are valid. 
Joint validity of time effects 
H0: 𝝀𝟏 = 𝝀𝟐 = 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝀𝟏  ≠ 𝝀𝟐 ≠ ⋯ 𝝀𝒏−𝟏 ≠ 𝟎 
F=1.51 F(0.01,8,113)= 2.673 Time effects are invalid. The error term takes a 
one-way error component form. 
Hausman (1978) specification 
test 
H0: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐭|𝐗𝐢𝐭) = 𝟎 
HA: 𝐄(𝛍𝐢𝐭|𝐗𝐢𝐭) ≠ 𝟎 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
H0: 𝜹𝐢
𝟐 = 𝜹      for all i 
H0: 𝜹𝐢
𝟐 ≠ 𝜹       for all i 
 
Cross-sectional dependence tests 
H0: 𝝆𝒊𝒋 = 𝝆𝒋𝒊 =
𝒄𝒐𝒓(𝝁𝒊𝒕, 𝝁𝒋𝒕) = 𝟎  
HA: 𝝆𝒊𝒋 ≠ 𝝆𝒋𝒊 = 𝟎 
m3=44.30 
 
 
 
LM = 2206 
p = 0.0000 
 
 
 
p = 0.0000 
Regressors not exogenous.  
 
 
The variance of the error term is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity is present. 
 
Pesaran (2004) CD test:  
 
 
CD = 2.428 
(0.405) 
 
p = 0.015 
 
Cross sections are interdependent. 
 
 
The diagnostics reveal that the fixed effects were valid and time effects invalid. Hence a one-way error 
component model was specified. Further, heteroskedasticity of the error term was detected. The 
Hausman (1978) specification test also revealed that the regressors were not exogenous and were 
correlated with the error term. This is apparent from the correlation matrix reported in Table 1 as the 
lagged book leverage variable is highly correlated to the firm level determinants of capital structure. The 
endogeneity arises from the correlation of the independent variables with the lagged dependent variable, 
which is referred to as Nickel bias. Further, the tests revealed the problem of cross sectional 
dependence. At the first instance, in order to remedy the above problems estimation was done with the 
framework of Generalised Method of Moments. A one-step diff-GMM and one-step system-GMM 
estimators were used to estimate the model. However due to the small sample properties of the data 
employed in this study, caution was exercised in relying solely on these GMM estimators, as they 
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perform moderately for small datasets. At the second instance the LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction 
estimator was employed. Judson and Owen (1999, p. 14) demonstrate that the corrected LSDV 
estimator is suitable for studies employing small data sets, as the bias is low. Notwithstanding, the 
results from the three estimators are reported. However, for interpretation purposes, the corrected LSDV 
results are used. 
4.3. Estimation Results of Target Capital Structure with Book Leverage as the Dependent 
Variable 
The estimation results of the regression to determine the existence of a target capital structure are 
presented in Table 3. The estimation results are consistent amongst the three estimators. The results 
indicate that South African banks have a target capital structure and adjust to this target at a rate of (1-
 𝛿) = 1- 0.558 = 44.2%. This means that South African banks are able to adjust fully towards this target 
once in every 2.3 years. The results bear striking similarity to the study by Gropp and Heider (2010:608) 
who find for their sample of US and EU banks the speed of adjustment to be 45%.  They also reason 
that, the fact that banks have high speeds of adjustment towards a target capital structure negates the 
“regulatory view” of bank capital. Comparatively for their sample of South African non-financial firms, 
Lemma and Negash (2014, p. 86) find that their adjustment speed is 22.7% with respect to the total debt 
ratio. This is lower in comparison to the banks.  
Table 3. Panel regression results to determine target capital structure with book leverage as the dependent 
variable 
 Difference-GMM 
(one-step) 
System-GMM 
(one-step) 
LSDV with Kiviet (1995) 
correction 
Leverage (-1) 
0.554*** 0.524*** 0.558*** 
(3.88) (3.97) (7.98) 
Growth 
0.101*** 0.067***  0.080*** 
(4.36) (3.00) (35.86 ) 
Profit 
-0.706*** -1.045*** -0.677*** 
(-5.62) (-4.76) (-47.86)   
Asset Tangibility 
-1.294*** -1.000 0.568   
(-2.28) (-1.39) (1.00)  
Risk 
0.257*** -0.016 0.211*** 
(4.72) (-0.19) (8.47)  
Size 
0.007 0.001 0.013*** 
(0.54) (0.95) (19.19 )   
Dividend 
-0.011 0.021** 0.003 
(-1.00) (2.09) (0.46) 
GFC 
0.013 0.016** 0.013***  
(2.19) (2.10) (23.49)  
AR(1) statistic -1.75* -1.17  
AR(2) statistic 0.846 0.965  
Sargan 7.12 27.9**  
(*)/(**) and (***) indicates the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses 
The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the sample of 16 South African banks for the 
period 2006-2015. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛿𝜷𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′ + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       
Where: the dependent variable = book leverage, Leveragei,t−1 =lagged book leverage;  𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′  = a vector of explanatory 
variables (Size, Profitability, Growth, Asset tangibility, Dividend, Risk and GFC) for bank i at time t; β = a vector of slope 
parameters; 𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term which embodies all the observable effects; εi,t = composite error term which also 
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takes care of other explanatory variables that equally determines leverage but are not included in the model and 𝛿 = the speed 
of adjustment. 
The speed of adjustment reflects the cost of adjustment. Arguably, the costs of adjustment in South 
Africa are comparable to those of developed countries. Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012, p. 61) contend that 
the adjustment costs for South African firms are lower than for those in developed economies. Makina 
and Negash (2005, p. 145) demonstrated that stock market liberalisation brought about a decline in the 
cost of capital of firms in South Africa. As such, banks faced with lower adjustment costs are bound to 
adjust faster.  
4.4. Robustness Checks of Target Capital Structure 
In this section we report on the robustness checks conducted on the specified model of target capital 
structure with the alternative definitions of the dependent variable employed. The target capital structure 
regression was estimated with deposit leverage and next in turn with non-deposit leverage as the 
dependent variable. Following the same procedure, pre-estimation tests were conducted. Suffice to 
highlight that the same limitations that were identified when the book leverage was employed as the 
dependent variable were detected to be present. These are heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional 
dependence and Nickel bias. Consequently, estimation was done within the framework of estimators 
that mitigate these ills, namely the system-GMM and the LSDV with Kiviet (1995) correction 
estimators. The results of the estimation are documented in Table 4. The corrected LSDV estimator 
results are used to draw inferences.  
Table 4. Robustness checks of the target capital structure estimation 
 Deposit Leverage Non-Deposit Leverage 
System-GMM 
(one-step) 
LSDV with Kiviet 
(1995) 
correction 
System-GMM 
(one-step) 
LSDV with Kiviet 
(1995) 
correction 
Leverage (-1) 
0.756*** 0.659*** 0.600*** 0.310*** 
(17.29) (551.17) (5.74) (3.55) 
Growth 
0.004  0.017 0.092**  0.073*** 
(0.17) (0.92) (2.58) (8.75 ) 
Profit 
-1.511*** -1.442*** 0.998** 1.031*** 
(-3.37) (-7.51)   (2.80) (8.85)   
Asset 
Tangibility 
-0.173 1.692***   -0.518 -2.04***   
(-0.23) (4.44)  (-0.63) (-8.41)  
Risk 
-0.172* 0.428*** 0.422*** -0.425*** 
(-1.87) (3.90)  (6.52) (-3.08)  
Size 
-0.002** 0.014 0.003*** -0.011 
(-2.92) (0.34)   (3.85) (-0.31)   
Dividend 
0.017 0.015 0.003 -0.004 
(1.33) (1.48) (0.14) (-0.32) 
GFC 
0.011 0.020  0.004 -0.005 
(1.68) (0.83)  (0.30) (-0.26)  
AR(1) statistic 0.185  -1.19  
AR(2) statistic 0.290  0.93  
Sargan 107.65***  105.62***  
LM-statistic     
(*)/(**) and (***) indicates the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses 
The table above shows the results of estimating the following regression for the sample of 16 South African banks for the 
period 2006-2015. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛿𝜷𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′ + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       
   
E u r o E c o n o m i c a  
Issue 3(37)/2018                                                                                                     ISSN: 1582-8859 
FINACE, BANKING AND ACCOUNING  
113 
Where: the dependent variable = (non-)deposit leverage, Leveragei,t−1 = lagged (non-)deposit leverage;  𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′  = a vector of 
explanatory variables (Size, Profitability, Growth, Asset tangibility, Dividend, Risk and GFC) for bank i at time t; β = a vector 
of slope parameters; 𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term which embodies all the observable effects; εi,t = composite error term 
which also takes care of other explanatory variables that equally determines leverage but are not included in the model and 𝛿 = 
the speed of adjustment. 
The estimated results document evidence that South African banks seek target deposit leverage. The 
speed of adjustment towards target deposit leverage is (1- δ) =1-0.659 = 34.1%. In essence this means 
that the banks can adjust fully towards this target once in every 2.9 years. This is slower compared to 
the speed of adjustment with regards to total book leverage. It also demonstrates that the costs of 
adjustment with respect to deposits are relatively higher. We reason that the implication might be that 
the bank has to offer high interest rates on customer deposits as well as term deposits in order to attract 
more deposits. 
There is also consistency in estimation output of the target capital structure with non-deposit leverage as 
the dependent variable as presented in Table 4. Growth is positively related to non-deposit leverage. 
This implies that banks faced with growth prospects will finance out of debt.  This is consistent with the 
predictions of the pecking order theory. A negative and statistically significant result is predicted to 
exist between asset tangibility and non-deposit leverage. This again is in synch with the predictions of 
the pecking order theory. 
The empirical results also suggest that South African banks have a target non-deposit leverage ratio 
which they seek to achieve in their financing. They adjust towards this target at an average speed of 
adjustment towards of (1- 𝛿 ) =1-0.310 = 69%. This means that the banks can fully achieve this target 
once every 1.4 years. Comparatively this demonstrates that banks are able to achieve their target long-
term debt ratio rapidly as compared to achieving their deposit leverage target ratio. This demonstrates 
that South African banks will employ non-deposit liabilities first as an instrument of rapidly adjusting 
towards their target, should there be a widening leverage gap. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The present study sought to establish whether banks sought to achieve a target capital structure in their 
financing and if so, whether they adjust faster comparatively to non-financial firms. Unlike previous 
studies, this study employed panel data techniques that correct for cross-sectional dependence and 
heteroscedasticity to estimate the actual SOA. It was established that indeed South African banks have a 
target capital structure that they seek to achieve in their financing in a similar fashion to non-financial 
firms. However, they adjust at a faster pace compared to non-financial firms. Further, the speed with 
which South African banks adjust to attain their target level is comparable to that of banks in the 
developed world and is reflective of the low adjustment costs. This “targeting” behaviour is inconsistent 
with the “regulatory view” of bank capital structure and at worst the bank capital regulations might not 
be binding at all. 
When leverage was decomposed to its constituents, it was further demonstrated that the banks adjust 
faster to cover their non-deposit leverage gap as compared to covering their deposit leverage gap. South 
African banks are inclined to use long-term debt as an instrument of adjustment before they turn to 
deposits. It could be that adjustment costs are lower for long-term debt compared to that of deposits.  
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